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ceived and retained the proceeds from the unauthorized con-
duct,149 or has invoked judicial process to confirm such action. 150
Charles B. Sklar
Land Occupier's Liability to Trespassers
In recent times, the traditional rule that a land occupier is
liable to a trespasser only if the land occupier is guilty of fla-
grant misconduct has been considerably altered. Although the
trespasser still cannot recover for many injuries for which a per-
son lawfully upon the premises can recover, the courts have im-
posed certain duties upon land occupiers to avoid injuring tres-
passers. It is the purpose of this Comment to analyze these
duties.'
The trespasser is a person whose presence upon land is with-
out any claim of right secured by the permission of the occupier.
2
The occupier's permission may extend only to a portion of the
premises. Thus a person, lawfully upon the premises by virtue
of the occupier's consent, will nevertheless be considered a tres-
passer by entering into that part of the premises that he is not
authorized to enter.3
The degree of care required of the occupier to trespassers is
considerably less than what is owed to those lawfully on the
premises. 4 This partial immunity from liability to trespassers
149. Simon v. Barnett, 169 La. 642, 125 So. 743 (1930) ; Culverhouse v. Marx,
39 La. Ann. 809 (1887) ; Beau v. Drew, 15 La. Ann. 461 (1860) ; Campbell v.
McKnight, Gunby's Dec. 44 (2d Cir. 1885).
150. Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Henry Ericsson Co., 197 La. 732,
2 So.2d 195 (1941) (applied to court to confirm arbitration award) ; Camors &
Co. v. Losch, Mannings Unreported Cases 95 (garnishment of proceeds paid to
attorney under unauthorized settlement). Cf. Zibilich v. Rittenberg, 8 La. App.
628, 139 So. 309 (1932) (requested dismissal of original suit based on compro-
mise).
1. However, this discussion will not treat liability of land occupiers under the
attractive nuisance doctrine, which involves injuries to trespassing children due
to defective conditions of the premises. For a treatment of this doctrine, see Com-
ment, The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in Louisiana, 10 LoUISIANA LAW RE-
vizw 469 (1950).
2. Lynch v. American Brewing Co., 127 La. 848, 54 So. 123 (1911). See also
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 329 (1938).
3. Gray v. Elgutter, 5 La. App. 315 (1926) (maid entered into an unopened
apartment she was not supposed to clean).
4. Those persons coming onto the land of another have been classified into
three distinct groups by the courts, and the degree of the land occupier's obliga-
tion differs in each case. (1) The invitee is a person who comes upon the prop-
erty for some reason beneficial to the land occupier and with the land occupier's
express or implied invitation. See Gosey v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 100 So.2d
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extends to the family, employees, and servants of the occupier,5
and further extends to those whose activities on the premises are
in behalf of, and with the consent of, the occupier.0 For example,
in one case, a vendor who came upon the premises to deliver ma-
terials was held to be under the same relationship to trespassers
as the occupier.
7
Historical Perspective of the Trespasser
The immunity originally enjoyed by the land occupier quite
logically resulted from early English society that so greatly em-
phasized the value of ownership or occupancy of land." The
landowner's established position of importance and his interest
in the free and unrestricted use of his property overrode the
value placed upon the trespasser's interest in physical safety.
Thus there arose the common notion that the trespasser was a
wrongdoer, making it no wonder, as aptly stated by one writer,
that "the idea that poachers should have any legal rights in con-
nection with harm received in the course of their nefarious in-
311 (La. App. 1958) ; Mercer v. Tremont & G. Ry., 19 So.2d 270 (La. App. 1944).
See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 332 (1938). The occupier owes duties to the
invitee to use reasonable care in his active conduct and to protect him against
dangers of which he knows, or by reasonable care might discover. See Gosey v.
Kansas City Southern Ry., 100 So.2d 311 (La. App. 1958) ; Bartell v. Serio, 180
So. 460 (La. App. 1938) ; Ransom v. Kreeger Store, 158 So. 600 (La. App. 1935).
See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343 (1934). The term "business visitor" was
adopted by the RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 332. This section limits this class of per-
sons to those who have business dealings with the occupier. There is some ques-
tion as to this classification in regard to social guests. A recent Louisiana de-
cision placed a social guest in the same class that had before contained only per-
sons having business dealings with the occupier. See Alexander v. General Fire
& Life Assur. Corp., 98 So.2d 730 (La. App. 1957). (2) The licensee is a person
who comes upon the land by the consent or permission of the occupier. See Mercer
v. Tremont, 19 So.2d 270 (La. App. 1944) ; Mills v. Heidensfield, 192 So. 786
(La. App. 1939); Myers v. Gulf Public Service Corp., 132 So. 416 (La. App.
1931) ; Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling Works, 12 La. App. 652, 126 So. 707 (1930).
See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 330 (1938). The occupier owes the licensee duties
to use reasonable care in his active conduct and to warn him of concealed dan-
gers within his knowledge. See Mills v. Heidensfield, 192 So. 786 (La. App.
1939) ; Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling Works, 12 La. App. 652, 126 So. 707 (1930).
See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 340, 341, 342 (1934). (3) The third classifica-
tion is the trespasser.
5. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 434 (2d ed. 1955).
6. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § § 383-386 (1934).
7. Buchanan v. Chicago Ry., 9 La. App. 424, 119 So. 703 (1929). It should
be observed that those persons who are not entitled to the occupier's immunity are
on an equal footing with the trespasser and owe him a duty of reasonable care in
all respects. See Scott v. Claiborne Electric Corp., 13 So.2d 534 (La. App. 1943).
8. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1432 (1956) ; Eldridge, Tort Lia-
bility to Trespassers, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 32 (1937).
9. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.1 (1956) ; PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 76 (2d ed. 1955).
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trusion would have been sufficient to have caused an apoplectic
stroke to the judges of the age."'1
However, the land occupier's exalted position gave him no
license to hunt trespassers. An exception to the rule that the
occupier owed no duties to trespassers was recognized in that
the occupier could inflict no intentional harms upon the tres-
passer.1 1 While privileged to eject the intruder, the occupier
could not use a force that was more than necessary. 12 Nor could
the occupier deliberately set out traps or spring guns for a tres-
passer who might come on the premises. 13 Eventually the courts
condemned conduct on the occupier's part which was deemed
wilful and wanton.
4
In the nineteenth century courts began to expand the occu-
pier's duties to trespassers. Perhaps the most cogent reason as-
signed to the new attitude of the courts was that the new and
dangerous uses to which land was put during industrialization
presented a greater likelihood that trespassers would suffer
harm, and humanitarianism dictated that occupiers take greater
care in their operations." During this period of transition the
courts continued to pay verbal respect to the established rule
that an occupier owed no duty to a trespasser save to refrain
from wilful and wanton misconduct.' Nevertheless, methods
were found to soften this rule and extend certain duties to occu-
piers. These duties arose in two ways: those relating to the
active conduct of the occupier, and those relating to the condi-
tion of the premises.
10. Eldridge, Tort Liability to Trespas8ers, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 32, 33 (1937).
Courts have submitted several legal reasons for the land occupier's immunity. It
has been said that the trespasser assumes all risks in going onto another's prop-
erty. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1439 (1956). It has been said
that a trespasser is contributorily negligent. See PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 434 (2d
ed. 1955). A discussion of contributory negligence and the trespasser will appear
later in this Comment. It has been said that the presence of the trespasser is not
to be anticipated; thus a reasonable man would not take steps to protect him.
See PROSSER, op. cit. supra at 433, 434. But the basic reason behind the occupier's
immunity would seem to be that "in a civilization based on private ownership, it
is considered a socially desirable policy to allow a man to use his own land in his
own way, without the burden of watching for and protecting those who come there
without permission or right." PROSSER, op. cit. supra at 434.
11. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 435 (2d ed. 1955) ; Eldridge, Tort Liability to
Trespassers, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 32, 33 (1937).
12. PROSSER, LAW Op TORTS 435 (2d ed. 1955).
13. Eldridge, Tort Liability to Trespasse8rs, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 32, 33 (1937).
14. Ibid.; PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 435 (2d ed. 1955).
15. O'Connor v. Illinois Central R.R., 44 La. Ann. 339, 10 So. 678 (1892).
See Eldridge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 32, 33 (1937).




Perhaps the principal factor that contributed to the judicial
change of heart to trespassers was the advent of the railroad.
Persons persist in using the tracks as a mode of pedestrian
travel; as a result, the majority of cases that involve the occu-
pier's active misconduct are those cases in which the trespasser
has been struck by a locomotive.
The courts in Louisiana, while clinging to the rule that the
occupier is liable to the trespasser only for wilful and wanton
misconduct, 7 held that the railroad's failure to use reasonable
care after discovering the trespasser amounted to wilful and
wanton negligence.' The use of the terms wilful and wanton to
describe ordinary negligence is perhaps misleading since these
terms traditionally designated conduct, if not intentional, bear-
ing a high degree of culpability. Suffice it to say, however, that
as an established rule the engineer owes a duty of reasonable
care to the trespasser on the tracks when the trespasser's pres-
ence is known.
The duty to use reasonable care in relation to the known
trespasser on the tracks has by no means created such an inex-
orable rule of law that when a person is seen upon the tracks
the train must be immediately halted. The engineer is allowed
to assume that a person travelling the tracks has normal facul-
ties 9 and is ordinarily required only to give a warning whistle.
20
If it becomes apparent, however, that the signal is not heard, the
engineer must then make every reasonable effort to avoid the
17. Jones v. Sibley L.B. & S. Ry., 121 La. 39, 46 So. 61 (1908) ; McClanahan
v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry., 111 La. 781, 35 So. 902 (1902) ; McGuire v. Vicksburg
S. & P. Ry., 46 La. Ann. 1543, 16 So. 457 (1894) ; Settoon v. Texas & P. Ry., 48
La. Ann. 807, 19 So. 759 (1896) ; Schexnaydre v. Texas & P. Ry., 46 La. Ann.
248, 14 So. 513 (1894) ; Snyder v. Natchez, Red River & Texas Ry., 42 La. Ann.
802, 7 So. 582 (1890).
18. Roberts v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 132 La. 446, 61 So. 522 (1913);
Spizale v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 128 La. 187, 54 So. 714 (1911) ; Davis v.
Arkansas Southern Ry., 117 La. 320, 41 So. 587 (1906) ; McClanahan v. Vicks-
burg S. & P. Ry., 111 La. 781, 35 So. 902 (1902).
19. Cook v. Louisiana N.W. Ry., 130 La. 917, 58 So. 767 (1912) (boy on side
of track suddenly leaped in path of train) ; Hebert v. Louisiana W. R.R., 104
La. 483, 29 So. 239 (1901) (deceased was sitting on tracks, apparently con-
scious) ; Schexnaydre v. Texas & P. Ry., 46 La. Ann. 248, 14 So. 513 (1894)
(deaf mute on tracks) ; Houston v. Vicksburg S. & Ry. Co., 39 La. Ann. 796, 2
So. 562 (1887) (deceased got hysterical, began running down the track) ; Patter-
son v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 187 So. 305 (La. App. 1939).
20. Sanders v. Texas & P. Ry., 118 La. 174, 42 So. 764 (1907) ; Provost v.
Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 52 La. Ann. 1894, 28 So. 305 (1900). See also Hyde v. Texas
& P. Ry., 143 La. 185, 78 So. 441 (1918) (failure to signal not negligence since
engineer thought it would frighten the deceased sleeping near the track).
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disaster by stopping the train.2 1 Thus, if the person seen upon
the tracks appears to be unconscious or unable to disengage him-
self from the tracks, the engineer is under a duty to use reason-
able efforts to halt the train.
22
Courts have been more reluctant to require engineers to anti-
cipate the presence of trespassers than to require proper care
after the trespasser's presence is discovered. However, in most
jurisdictions a rule has evolved that if the engineer knows that
trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited area, he is under
a duty to take reasonable care for those trespassers' safety.23 In
Louisiana the early case of Maguire v. Vicksburg Ry.2 4 held that
a failure of the engineer to use proper care in discovering a tres-
passer on a track running through a populous city amounted to
wilful and wanton negligence. While the basis of extending lia-
bility to the railroad in the Maguire case was criticized as an un-
warranted application of wilful and wanton negligence con-
cepts,25 the rule nevertheless has become established that an en-
gineer owes a duty of reasonable care to unknown trespassers
where, from the density of inhabitation, the number of road
crossings, and the known frequency of trespassers, the presence
of such trespassers on the track is likely.26 The requirement to
use reasonable care in such populous areas thus puts the engineer
21. Russo v. Texas & P. Ry., 189 La. 1042, 181 So. 485 (1938); Young v.
Thompson, 189 So. 487 (La. App. 1939) ; Monk v. Crowell & Spencer Lbr. Co.,
168 So. 360 (La. App. 1936).
22. Roberts v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 132 La. 446, 61 So. 522 (1913);
'Provost v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 52 La. Ann. 1894, 28 So. 305 (1900) ; Miller v.
Baldwin, 178 So. 717 (La. App. 1938). Contra, Sanders v. Texas & P. Ry., 118
La. 174, 42 So. 764 (1907).
23. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 439 (2d ed. 1955). See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§335 (1934).
24. McGuire v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry., 46 La. Ann. 1543, 16 So. 457 (1894).
25. McClanahan v. Vicksburg S. & P. By., 11 La. 781, 35 So. 902 (1902)
(dissent). However, several early cases extended a duty of reasonable care to the
railroad in such cases using other reasoning. In the McClanahan case, supra, it
was said that the track was a public highway and the railroad owed a duty to pro-
tect those persons upon the track. This position was refuted on rehearing. It has
been said that the railroad, by virtue of its formation in the public interest, puts
it under a duty to persons on the track, even though unknown. See Downing v.
Morgan's L. & T. Ry. & S.S. Co., 104 La. 508, 29 So. 207 (1900). Subsequent
cases held a duty to exist to anticipate unknown trespassers in certain areas on
the track. See Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 144 La. 520, 80 So. 708
(1919) ; Ingram v. Kansas City S. & G. Ry., 134 La. 377, 64 So. 146 (1914) ;
Harrison v. Louisiana W. Ry., 132 La. 761, 61 So. 782 (1913) ; Hammers v.
Colorado Southern, N.O. & P. Ry., 128 La. 648, 56 So. 4 (1911) ; Buhler v. Mor-
gan's L. & T. R.R. & S.S. Co., 129 La. 423, 56 So. 355 (1911) ; Spizale v. Louisi-
ana By. & N. Co., 128 La. 187, 54 So. 714 (1911) ; Davis v. Arkansas So. By.,
117 La. 320, 41 So. 587 (1905) ; Gilliam v. Texas & P. By., 114 La. 272, 38 So.
166 (1905) ; Provost v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 52 La. 1894, 28 So. 305 (1900).
26. Jones v. Chicago R.I. & P. By., 162 La. 690, 111 So. 62 (1927) ; Miller v.
Baldwin, 178 So. 717 (La. App. 1938).
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of the train under a duty to keep a sharp lookout 27 and maintain
a speed that will enable the train to be halted after discovering
the trespasser. 28  Such requirements naturally impose burdens
upon the public interest in speedy transit. This is especially true
at night when speed must be considerably reduced in order to
ascertain objects on the track in time to halt the train.2 9 In the
light of these considerations, the courts in recent years have lim-
ited the rule of reasonable care to unknown trespassers to areas
of very dense population. 0
Cases involving injuries to trespassers on the track are often
treated by the courts under the doctrine of last clear chance.81
The reason that this doctrine is employed is that in a great many
cases of this sort the court is faced with the defense that the
27. McClanahan v. Vicksburg S. & P. R.R., 11 La. 781, 35 So. 902 (1902) ;
McGuire v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry., 46 La. Ann. 1542, 16 So. 457 (1894) ; Griffin
v. Thompson, 11 So.2d 114 (La. App. 1942) ; Edwards v. Texas & P. Ry., 185 So.
111 (La. App. 1938) ; Miller v. Baldwin, 178 So. 717 (La. App. 1938) ; Sorey v.
Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 17 La. App. 538, 136 So. 155 (1931).
28. Shaw v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 39 F. Supp. 652 (W.D. La. 1941) ; Black-
'burn v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 144 La. 520, 80 So. 708 (1919) ; Downing v.
Morgan's L. & T. Ry. & S.S. Co., 104 La. 508, 29 So. 207 (1900) ; Hall v. Kansas
City So. Ry., 14 So.2d 485 (La. App. 1943) ; Shipp v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry.,
188 So. 526 (La. App. 1939).
29. Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 144 La. 520, 80 So. 708 (1919)
Shipp v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 188 So. 526 (La. App. 1939).
30. Hollinquest v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 76 So.2d 568 (La. App. 1954) (near a
community of 1500 but few habitations on the track; no negligence in failing to
discover the trespasser) ; Hall v. Kansas City So. Ry., 14 So.2d 485 (La. App.
1943) (one mile from thickly populated town of De Quincey, near a crossing, no
negligence in failing to reduce speed or keep a lookout) ; Sullivan v. Yazoo & M.V.
Ry., 8 So.2d 109 (La. App. 1942) (evidence of a footpath, 150 houses within a
mile; no negligence in failing to reduce speed or in failing to watchout) ; Bourgeois
v. New Orleans T. & M. Ry., 193 So. 394 (La. App. 1940) (very small hamlet,
sparsely populated, no negligence in failing to reduce speed). Often recovery is
denied, when, even though the train is in an area so populated that speed should
have been reduced and a lookout kept, circumstances would have prevented dis-
covery of the trespasser even had such care been taken. These cases do not mean
that the railroad was not negligent, but that the negligence did not in fact cause
the injury to the trespasser. Royal v. Kansas City So. Ry., 75 So.2d 705 (La.
App. 1954) (extremely thick blanket of fog) ; Griffin v. Thompson, 11 So.2d 114
(La. App. 1942) (train going around a curve).
31. Russo v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 189 La. 1042, 181 So. 485 (1938) ; Jones v.
Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 162 La. 690, 111 So. 62 (1927) ; Blackburn v. Louisiana
Ry. & Nay. Co., 144 La. 520, 80 So. 708 (1919) ; Harrison v. Louisiana Western
Ry., 132 La. 761, 61 So. 782 (1913) ; McClanahan v. Vicksburg S. & 'P. By., 11
La. 781, 35 So. 902 (1902) ; Tillman v. Public Belt B. Comm., 42 So.2d 888 (La.
App. 1949) ; Williams v. Missouri Pae. Ry., 11 So.2d 658 (La. App. 1942) ; Young
v. Thompson, 189 So. 487 (La. App. 1939) ; Monk v. Crowell & Spencer Lbr. Co.,
168 So. 360 (La. App. 1936) ; Johnson v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 16 La. App. 464, 133
So. 517 (1931); Gibson v. Texas & Pac. By., 10 La. App. 678, 121 So. 882
(1929) ; Buard v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 5 La. App. 725 (1926).
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trespasser is contributorily negligent. 82 Last clear chance is a
limitation to the concept of contributory negligence. In Louisi-
ana, according to the doctrine, despite the fact that the plaintiff
is contributorily negligent, if the plaintiff is in a helpless posi-
tion, and the defendant knows or should know of the plaintiff's
peril, the defendant is nevertheless liable to the plaintiff. 8 It is
to be noted that last clear chance does not add to the duties owed
by the railroad to trespassers; the effect of the doctrine is simply
that the railroad's defense of contributory negligence will not
succeed.
Other than the cases involving injuries to trespassers on the
tracks, few cases have arisen involving the occupier's active mis-
conduct. Generally any intentional force that is more than neces-
sary to eject the trespasser from the premises will render the
occupier liable to the trespasser.3 4 But it is uncertain whether
the same rules involving negligent misconduct of the occupier
that were applied in the railroad cases will be applied elsewhere.
In Cannon v. Mengals5 a nightwatchman allowed two boys to
sleep upon a boiler in the defendant's mill. Another employee,
not knowing of the presence of the boys, opened an escape valve
on the boiler, resulting in death to one of the boys. Since the
watchman's knowledge of the trespasser's presence could be im-
puted to the defendant, the intruders were known trespassers.
While quoting a common law authority for the proposition that
the failure to use reasonable care to a known trespasser was con-
sidered wilful and wanton negligence, the court nevertheless held
that the negligence involved in turning the escape valve was not
great enough to warrant recovery. In the light of the authority
the court itself quoted, any failure to use reasonable care should
have rendered the occupier liable. The decision in the Cannon
case well illustrates the confusion that can occur due to the use
32. Fils v. Iberia St. M. & E. Ry., 145 La. 544, 82 So. 697 (1919) Tyler v.
Gulf C. & C. F. Ry., 143 La. 177, 78 So. 438 (1918) ; Gilliam v. Texas & P. Ry.,
114 La. 272, 38 So. 166 (1905) ; Provost v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 52 La. Ann. 1894,
28 So. 305 (1900) ; Houston v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 39 La. Ann. 796, 2 So.
562 (1887) ; Brown v. Texas & P. Ry., 193 So. 511 (La. App. 1940) ; Patterson
v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 187 So. 305 (La. App. 1939).
33. Tillman v. Public Belt. Ry. Comm., 42 So.2d 888 (La. App. 1949). The
doctrine may be referred to as the doctrine of unconscious last clear chance, or of
apparent peril. The Tillman case, supra, presents a clear statement of last clear
chance.
34. Dorsey v. Kansas City P. & G. Ry., 104 La. 478, 29 So. 177 (1901)
(brakeman threw rocks at trespasser riding underneath box cars) ; Jackson v. St.
Louis S.W. Ry., 52 La. Ann. 1706, 28 So. 241 (1900) (boy kicked off a moving
train) ; Young v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 51 La. Ann. 295, 25 So. 69 (1898) (cripple
kicked off a moving train).
35. 8 La. App. 375 (1928).
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of the misleading terms, wilful and wanton. Despite the Cannon
case, however, there would seem to be no reason why the same
rule applied in the railroad cases involving known trespassers
should not also be applied in other circumstances. 86
There are no Louisiana cases other than those involving in-
juries to persons upon the railroad tracks in which the occupier
is required to use reasonable care to unknown trespassers. How-
ever, the rule that in areas frequented by trespassers the occu-
pier must use reasonable care in his activities has been extended
to situations other than those involving injuries on the railroad
tracks in many jurisdictions. However, this rule has been so
extended only when the activity engaged in by the occupier is
highly dangerous.37 One Louisiana case has indicated by way of
dicta that there is no reason why this rule would not apply to all
situations in which the occupier is engaged in highly dangerous
activities. 88
Condition of the Premises
The occupier is under no general duty to maintain the condi-
tion of his premises so that trespassers will escape injury other
than to refrain from deliberate efforts to injure the intruder. 89
However, the Louisiana courts, like many other jurisdictions,
have held that the acquiescence on the part of the occupier to a
frequent number of intrusions in a limited area amounts to the
consent necessary to term the intruder a licensee, to whom great-
er duties are owed than trespassers.40 Three factors must be
present in order to render the occupier liable in these cases. (1)
The area in which the condition exists must be one in which per-
sons are in the habit of intruding and the occupier must know of
36. Most jurisdictions apply this rule in all situations. See PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 436 (2d ed. 1955).
37. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 336 (1934).
38. Tillman v. Public Belt Ry. Comm., 42 So.2d 888 (La. App. 1949).
39. Tomlinson v. Vicksburg S. & P. Ry., 143 La. 641, 79 So. 174 (1918) ; Jef-
ferson v. King, 12 La. App. 249, 124 So. 589 (1930) ; Gray v. Elgutter, 5 La.
App. 315 (1929).
40. Taylor v. Baton Rouge Sash and Door Works, 68 So.2d 159 (La. App.
1953) ; Mercer v. Tremont & G. Ry., 19 So.2d 270 (La. App. 1944) ; Mills v.
Heidensfield, 192 So. 786 (La. App. 1939) ; Builliard v. New Orleans Terminal
Co., 166 So. 640 (La. App. 1936). See also PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 438 (2d ed.
1955). The main criticism of calling such intruders licensees is that in the usual
situation, the occupier allows the intruders to enter, not because he acquiesces,
but because it would be too burdensome to keep them out. Under such circum-
stances it could not be said that the occupier freely consents to the intrusion. See
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 438 (2d ed. 1955).
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these frequent intrusions.41 (2) The condition must be artificial
and constitute a newly created obstacle which has altered the
path of intrusion. In Builliard v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 42 a
drawbridge which was frequently used by passing laborers was
raised and the plaintiff was suspended upon the draw before
having to leap to the ground. The court held that the defendant
had altered the condition of the premises and was liable to the
plaintiff for his failure to give a warning before raising the
draw. While it would seem that, by raising the draw, the defend-
ant's negligence was more in the nature of active misconduct
rather than an altering of the condition of the premises, the prin-
ciple of this case remains. 4  (3) The condition must constitute
a "trap," that is, it must be one that the occupier knows in fact
to exist, and which the trespasser could not have ascertained by
using reasonable care.44 In addition, the Restatement of Torts
requires that the condition be one highly dangerous in nature.
45
It is to be observed that the occupier is not obligated to restore
the premises to its original condition. An adequate warning will
suffice to discharge his duty to the intruder.
46
If the existence of the trespasser is known in fact, the Re-
statement of Torts takes the position that the occupier must
warn him of known hazards which are artificial and highly dan-
gerous, but few jurisdictions support this rule. 47 It has been
pointed out that this rule would logically follow in a jurisdiction
like Louisiana, which imposes a duty upon the occupier to warn
41. Taylor v. Baton Rouge Sash and Door Works, 68 So.2d 159 (La. App.
1953) ; Builliard v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 166 So. 640 (La. App. 1936).
42. 166 So. 640 (La. App. 1935).
43. Venezie v. Salles, 176 So. 407 (La. App. 1937). Here the plaintiff was
a customer in a department store. He used a restroom, which, though customers
were not authorized to use, was still used by the customers. The plaintiff was
injured by an altered condition in the passageway. Recovery was allowed.
44. Taylor v. Baton Rouge Sash and Door Works, 8 So.2d 159 (La. App.
1953) (plaintiff could have discovered the condition by using care; defendant ap-
parently did not know of the condition). See also Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling
Works, 12 La. App. 652, 126 So. 707 (1930).
45. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 336 (1934). It is to be observed that the Reatate-
ment treats the intruders as trespassers and does not elevate them to licensees be-
cause of the occupier's acquiescence.
46. Builliard v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 166 So. 640 (La. App. 1935);
Myers v. Gulf Public Service Corp., 132 So. 416 (La. App. 1931).
47. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 337 (1934). See Martin v. Jones, 122 Utah 597,
253 P.2d 359 (1953). CJontra, Carroll v. Spencer, 204 Md. 387, 104 A.2d 628
(1954) ; Bush v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 Atl. 809 (1898).
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unknown and frequent intruders of newly created hazards.'4
However, no Louisiana courts have directly decided this point.49
James FarTier
48. The Restatement justified the rule for this reason. See Eldridge, Tort
Liability to Trespassers, 12 Tmn'. L.Q. 82, 48 (1937).
49. See Gaylord Container Corp. v. Miley, 230 F.2d 177, 181 (1956). Here
a drunk wandered off a public path 35 feet into defendant's property, where he
fell into a flume. Defendant's employees had seen him in the area, knew he was
drunk, but failed to warn him. The court held that a drunk, being like a child in
capacity, was owed the duty an occupier owes children to maintain safe conditions
by the highway where children may wander. See RESTATEMzET, TORTS 1867
(1934). The court held also that even though the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, the defendant was liable under the doctrine of last clear chance. It
would seem that this case is one properly coming under the principle that the
occupier must warn a trespasser of known hazardous conditions. Id. § 837.
